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Combat Motivation and the
Roots of Fanaticism
The 12th SS Panzer Division
Hitlerjugend in Nor111andy
Michael E. Sullivan
l"' Tar veterans generally retain a grudging
VV respect towards their old enemy.
Statements like, "I hold no ill will against them,"
or "They were only doing their jobs" are
commonplace. However, no one makes these
statements about the 12th SS Panzer Division
Hitlerjugend. More often than not, the sentiment
of Allied veterans towards the 12th SS is one of
revulsion and hate. Even the Germans thought
they were a particularly nasty bunch. Raised in
1943 from selected members of the Hitler Youth
who were born in 1926, the rank and file of the
12th SS had been the first children to 'volunteer'
for compulsory service in the Hitler Youth on
his birthday in 1936. In the aftermath of
Stalingrad this priviledged cadre of 17 and 18
year-old Nazis was then targeted for a special
division to be led by battle-hardened veterans
of the 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte
Adolf Hitler (LAH). During the Normandy
campaign of 1944 the 12th SS gained an
unenviable reputation for brutality and
fanaticism, much of that directed at the
Canadians who fought them first and met them
repeatedly throughout that summer. What
follows here is an attempt to explain why the
12th SS was so very different from the other
Axis divisions, even other SS ones, that the Allies
faced in Europe.
Simply put, the main reason for the unique
(and abominable) actions of the 12th SS lay in
their combat motivation. The motivating factors
of any soldier are numerous, complex, and never
static. Anthony Kellett was the first to really focus
on the holistic and situational nature of combat
motivation, which he defined as:

the conscious or unconscious calculation by the
combat soldier of the material and spiritual
benefits and costs likely to be attached to various
courses of action arising from his assigned
combat tasks. Hence motivation comprises the
influences that bear on a soldier's choice of,
degree of commitment to, and persistence in
effecting, a certain course of action. 1

The task in this case is to try to determine what
influences bore on the 12th SS soldier's "choice
of, degree of commitment to, and persistence in
effecting" their course of action, both on and off
the battlefield.

The 12th SS inAction
~ere

is no doubt that the actions of the 12th

~ SS were viewed as unacceptable by their
opponents. An investigation by the Supreme

Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force
(SHAEF) Court of Inquiry determined that "the
conduct of the 12th SS Panzer Division (HitlerJugend) presented a consistent pattern of
brutality and ruthlessness." Significantly, this
view was also shared by the 12th SS's German
comrades. The SHAEF report stated that the
12th SS gained for itself "a most unsavory
reputation, even among the rest of the German
Armed Forces, [which] is evident from the fact
that German prisoners taken, admit that it was
called the 'Murder Division. '" 2 A member of the
Polish Army also recorded that the 12th SS had
a general reputation among the German troops
as being reckless and murders. 3 Grenadier
George Mertens, a member of the 26th Panzer
Grenadier Regiment, one of the two infantry
regiments of the 12th SS, claimed that he did
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Soldiers from the 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend photographed during the early stages of the Normandy
campaign. Atrocities commited by men from this unit led to it being referred to as "the murder division."

not know that they had a bad reputation until
he heard it in a prison camp. His reaction was
"I could hardly believe it." In retrospect, though,
he believed that the label was deserved, and he
also admitted that he heard the term "Murder
Division" in his company. 4
There is no doubt that the label of"Murder
Division" was entirely justified. Howard
Margolian documented the murder of 156
Canadian prisoners of war at the hands of the
12th SS during the Normandy campaign. 5 In one
instance, soldiers of the 12th SS shot at a group
of 40 Canadian prisoners in a field near the
Caen-Fontenayroad on 8 June 1944, killing 35. 6
In another case, after shooting eight unarmed
Canadian prisoners in Authie on 7 June 1944,
soldiers from the 12th SS pulled their bodies
onto the road and ran over the corpses with
tanks. 7 Even simply being captured by the Hitler
Youth was a deeply disturbing experience. Major
J.D. Learmont of the North Nova Scotia
Highlanders described them as "wildly excited
and erratic."8 He noted that they "shouted and
screamed and behaved in an exceedingly
disorderly manner. Their actions were such as

might possibly be attributed to drugs. "9 Another
member of the North Nova Scotia Highlanders
who survived capture by the 12th SS stated:
They behaved like maniacs, firing their weapons
indiscriminately and acted as if they had been
doped, their faces were flushed and they danced
and jumped around in a very amazing manner.
I was with a group of about l 0 men, some being
of my platoon and others from "A" company and
we were literally chased across a field, the
Germans firing the sub machine guns at our
heels and shouting and acting like Indians. 10

If their actions were not disturbing enough,
it seemed that the soldiers who were a part of
these atrocities were proud of their
"accomplishments." For example, Untersturmjilhrer Karl-Walter Becker, a member of

the reconnaissance battalion attached to the 12th
SS said:
I asked [Obersturmjiihrer] Palm who had
committed this act [of shooting POWs] and was
told that it had been Oberscharfiihrer Stun and
men of the M/C DR section. Stun had been
particularly eager to distinguish himself by
committing this atrocity. 11

44
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Other members of the Wehrmacht also noted
this arrogance among the 12th SS. A member
of the 271st Infantry Division stated that he ran
into members of the 12th SS who informed him
that they had shot five or six Canadian POWs,
and that the "Canadians had apparently asked
the Nazis not to shoot, but as Preining's
informant jocularly remarked 'a machine pistol
fired by accident. '" 12
There have been recent attempts made by
revisionist historians, most notably Karl H.
Theile, to place the actions of the 12th SS in a
different light. Theile describes the actions of
the 12th SS as retaliation for actions of Canadian
soldiers on 25 June 1944 at Fontenay, although
no specific examples of Canadian atrocities were
given. Theile also claimed that many of the
alleged occurrences were "twisted, exaggerated
or simply made-up tales." This, of course, goes
against every shred of evidence that can be
uncovered. Theile's error is even more glaring
when it becomes evident that most of the
atrocities of the 12th SS occurred in the first
two weeks of the invasion, well before the date
given for the alleged Canadian atrocities. 13

The 12th SS did not receive their reputation
for being fanatical solely because of their actions
against their prisoners. Rather, they gained the
label of fanatical also as a result of their actions
during battle. The soldiers of the 12th SS were
informed by their officers that they were "not to
give themselves up and must commit suicide if
there is no other choice left. " 14 This order was
one of the so-called secret orders given to the
12th SS weeks before the invasion began. The
authenticity of these orders has been disputed,
but there is considerable evidence that orders
similar to these were given. What is clear is that
the soldiers of the 12th SS internalized this
notion, along with the years of ideological
indoctrination that they were subject to, and
transferred these beliefs onto the battlefield. ssBrigadejilhrer Kurt Meyer, who eventually
became commander of the 12th SS, and who
was later convicted by a Canadian court of war
crimes, once described a fanatic that he had
observed in Russia:
Bitter fighting is going on, especially on the right
of the road. Here a young, spirited commissar
is spurring his unit on again and again. It is not
only his yelling which fires his men, but also his

Two soldiers from 12th SS captured by the Canadians during the fighting for Buran, 7 July 1944.
Though their war is finished, these wounded soldiers remain defiant as they glare at the camera while
marching in step to the prisoner of war cage.
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bold example which keeps them coming on. I
shall never forget the last picture of this man
pulled up to his full height. throwing his last
grenades at Mahl"s section. Even so he solemnly
drops the last one to the ground in front of him
and covers it with his body. A quick lift and a
shudder of the body, a fall of the shattered
corpse, that is the end of a fanatic. 15

Meyer's description is surprisingly similar to the
actions of the boys who fought under his
command in Normandy. During the battles
around Falaise, Meyer noted that they "all know
that the battle can only end with death or
capture, but nobody is ready to stop fighting. "16
Manv of the soldiers would not accept capture
as a~ alternative to death or dishonour. When
Untersturrrifilhrer Reinhold Fuss and a few
members of his platoon found themselves
trapped in a church cemetery by the Canadians
they "prepared for defence to the last." However,
the Canadians just left them alone, since nobody
wanted to risk their lives trying to capture a few
fanatical teenagers who would, in all likelihood,
not surrender without a fight. This proved to be
a shrewd decision, because the SS soldiers had
no intentions of surrendering. The Germans
took turns working at digging a hole through a
stone wall with a bayonet. After six days, without
food and water, they had dug a hole big enough
to escape, which they did during the night. 17

Where escape was not an option for the 12th
SS, death was usually the end. For example, SSMann Alfred Matthei. a member of the 2nd
Engineer Training Battalion, noted that when he
was taken prisoner by the Canadians, most of
his comrades "declared they would fight to the
last man." 18 The War Diary of 1st Battalion of
The Canadian Scottish Regiment recorded an
incident during the fighting for Point 168 on 15
August 1944 when one young grenadier
committed suicide instead of being captured. 19
Perhaps the most disturbing example of this type
of attitude by the 12th SS occurred during the
final battles around Falaise, when a group of 50
to 60 Grenadiers were forced behind the walls
of a school. A systematic Canadian attack on
the school began after weaker attempts had
failed. None of the 12th SS soldiers wanted to
leave to report their situation, even though they
all knew that remaining in their position meant
death or capture. So the group drew lots to see
who would be unlucky enough to carry the
message and live. Eventually, the stronghold was
eliminated, and there were only four prisoners
left to be taken by the Canadians. Meyer called
it "an outstanding example of the gallantry and
willingness to sacrifice themselves." 20 It is more
properly seen as the act of teenagers who were
systematically moulded into fanatical fighters by
years of indoctrination by the Nazi leadership.

Dejected soldiers from the 12th SS captured by 3rd Canadian Infantry Division in Normandy stand beh.in.d barbed
wire. Their camoflage uniforms which distinguished them from other German forces are clearly VISible.
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For the officers and men of the 12th SS, there
was a certain kind of romance to be found in
the battlefield. The interrogators of Kurt Meyer
noted:
To [Meyer] the battle of Caen-Falaise was
magnificent in the best Wagnerian tradition. As
he described his actions and those of his men,
it seemed as though he liked to consider himself
as Siegfried leading his warriors to their death.
When he described how he came out of the
Falaise Gap with sixty men, it is likely that the
familiar strains of the "Twilight of the Gods" were
echoing in his ears. 21

Even so, romantic notions of Wagnerian death
in battle do not explain the positively brutal
fighting espoused by the members of the 12th
SS. One report stated:
Later in the evening, the outstanding 46th Royal
Marine Commando attacked the hand-picked
boys of the Hitlerjugend. "They fought like lions
on both sides. The dead were lying body to body,"
wrote the historians of the Chaudieres
[Regiment] who reached the village the next
morning. "We searched every house, every yard,
to prevent ambushes. That is the confirmation
of how brutal the fighting oflast night must have
been. The commandos were lying dead in rows
next to the dead SS-men. Hand grenades were
scattered everywhere in the streets and front
doors of the houses. At one spot we saw a
commando and an SS-man who died virtually
arm-in-arm, one killing the other. At another spot
we found a German and a Canadian tank, having
crushed each other. They were still smoking and
from each of the smoke-blackened turrets hung
the dead bodies of the machine gunners. Over
there was a squad which had run toward a small
wall to seek cover. They had been shot down
before they reached it. And then, at the church,
as the vanguard of"C" Company and the Carettes
swung around the corner, they encountered three
Germans. Only three. But one of them
immediately drew his pistol and hit one of our
men. A machine gunner killed two of the three
SS-men, but the survivor did not surrender. He
tricked us and disappeared. Now you will
understand what fanatics we were fighting. 22

Kurt Meyer even stated that he knew of at least
three separate cases between 9 June 1944 and
7 July 1944 when one of his men tied explosives
to his body and jumped onto an Allied tank to
destroy it. 23 No man, let alone a teenage boy, will
do that instinctively unless he has been
instructed and indoctrinated into a fanatical style
of fighting.

The Origins of Fanaticism
he origins of such a fanatical combat
motivation are complex, but Margolian is
correct in bringing attention to the role that the
1st SS officers had on the development of the
12th SS as a fighting force. The link between
competent officers and motivated soldiers is
reflected throughout the historical and social
scientific literature. In the sociological
examination of this particular relationship, Dean
Havron and Joseph McGrath determined that
leader intelligence,
knowledge
and
implementation of job skills, and a sense ofthe
feelings of their men by the officer are key to the
performance and motivation of a unit. The higher
these factors are present in a leader, the more
likely the unit will be highly motivated and
effective. 24 Kellett determined that a soldier will
obey and follow a leader if they meet their
expectations, which many generally do. The
more they meet these expectations, the more
motivated the soldiers are in following them into
battle. He also found that the most effective form
of leadership is through example. Following a
leader is easier for the soldier than fulfilling
orders while their officers watch them from a
distance.

T

Finally, Kellett concluded that an important
way for soldiers to increase their combat
motivation was through modelling oneself after
a successful leader. Kellett also asserted that the
effectiveness of the Wehrmacht was a result of
the presence of these qualities within the
leadership of the German Army during the
Second World War. 25 These exact qualities were
quite evident, and purposely strived for, by the
officers of the 12th SS. Accordingly, if the officer
of a unit embodied the characteristics of an
excellent soldier, their example would definitely
reflect upon the combat motivation of their unit.
John Keegan identified the presence of the "Big
Man" as one of the vital elements in the combat
motivation of a soldier. The presence in a unit
of a soldier who appears to be the embodiment
of the perceived ideal soldier, the one who "brings
combat alive" through his actions on the field,
will positively affect the motivation of a soldier.
Another key element of Keegan's theory of
combat motivation was that of mimicry, which
can be defined as the efforts of a soldier in an
attempt to emulate the actions of the "Big Man."
47
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For the soldiers of the 12th SS, the "Big Man" of
their unit was their officer, and there was a
consistent effort on the part of the average soldier
to imitate their leaders within every aspect of
training and combat. 26 The bitter fighting in the
Russian campaign that the soldiers in the 1st
SS (LAH) experienced would have definitely
influenced the way that the officers of the 12th
SS led their men. This highly developed brutal
ethos of fighting was transferred to the formative
minds of the teenagers they led to battle, youth
whose years of ideological indoctrination was
immediately validated by the words and the
actions of their officers. For these boys, being
led by the heros and former members of"Hitler's
Fire Brigade" would be akin to a midget hockey
player playing on a line with Wayne Gretzky and
Mario Lemieux.
Along with the sense of pride that came with
fighting alongside their heros, whom they did
not want to disappoint, came the added
motivator of being a part of the SS. Blackburn
noted that "the creation of the cult of the Nazi
SS elite was a result of Hitler's effort to "minister"
to the psychic ills of his more fanatical followers.
Unable to face the postwar world without
direction, Heinrich Himmler and his wayward
brawlers, searching desperately for some truth,
followed a leader who would make everything
come out alright. "27 This dependence on Hitler
for their identity meant that the most radical
aspects
of the
National
Socialist
Weltanschauung (world view) were internalized
by the men of the SS. Realizing the potential that
this group would have in the acquisition,
consolidation, and maintenance of power, the
National Socialist leadership strove to harness
their energy and mindless devotion.
SS education consisted of moulding the
mentality of the man. The basic attitude strived
for was that the SS man should be a fighter for
fighting's sake, which was known as "heroic
realism." The soldier had to obey
unquestioningly, had to be hard and impervious
to all human emotions, be contemptuous of
"inferior beings," show comradeship and
camaraderie, and believe that the word
"impossible" did not exist. However, the spirit
of combat efficiency was the real governing
principle in the SS. The "hardness" trait of the
SS man was key, and it was viewed on two levels.
On the ideological level, the concept of hardness

evolved from National Socialist concepts of
inhumanity, mercilessness, and savagery. On the
military level, the fighting nature of the SS
demanded that its men should have no
hesitation in shedding either his own blood or
the blood of foreigners. 28 As a result of their
education, the SS soldier would have
internalized the fact that their life belonged to
"the German kingdom," available for use in any
way to protect the National Socialist
Weltanschauung. 29 The SS man would have also
known that he was indeed a part of an elite
organization at the apex of German society, 30 a
feeling that would have translated itself into the
motivation on the battlefield.

Elite Status and Symbols
ince the Hitler Youth, through the years of
resocialization
and
ideological
indoctrination, embodied the qualities that the
SS wanted, the SS were quite eager to recruit
the Hitler Youth into their ranks and transmit
their own radicalized values to their new
recruits. Although at first the German army
officials would not permit active recruitment of
the Hitler Youth by the SS, by 1934 they allowed
volunteers in reserve units to go with the SS (still
a small Nazi party Preatorian guard) if there were
no pressing army needs. This essentially gave
Himmler all the justification that he needed to
form a strong bond with the Hitler Youth in order
to siphon off its members to the ranks of his
private army. He instructed his SS leaders to
initiate and preserve good relations with Hitler
Youth leaders, and systematic Hitler Youth
recruitment was discussed as early as 1935. A
feeling emerged that the SS would be the
preferred destination for the best of the Hitler
Youth graduates, a sort of transfer from one elite
Party formation to the other. The stringent
conditions imposed on joining the SS created
"an aura of preferment" that made it easy to
attract and foster loyalty and dedication by those
who were lucky enough to be accepted. 31 When
the SS began recruitment for the 12th SS, the
standards were so high that it was certain that
only the elite members of the Hitler Youth who
were eligible would be accepted.

S

The elite status of the 12th SS in the German
military was constantly stressed to its men. In
his speech to future members of the division at
their graduation from the Wehrertilch-

48
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tigungslager der Hitler-Jugend (Hitler Youth

Military Instruction Camps - WEL [see below])
in 1943, Artur Axmann stated:
You are the elite of German youth ... .In your unit,
my comrades, the soldierly tradition of the Hitler
Youth will find its ultimate expression. That is
the reason why all German youths direct their
attention to this unit, to you; that is why the
honour of German youth depends on you.

Axmann was followed by Himmler, who echoed
this sentiment:
In these weeks, when the sacrifice ofStalingrad
was on everyone's mind, when the Russians
mounted massive attacks, your Youth Leader
made the decision to offer to the Fuhrer the best
young boys of the new class for a new Waffen SS
division. The Fuhrer agreed happily .... After a
few months in SS barracks you will enter a great
formation .... You will then train some more, lose
many drops of sweat in order to save drops of
blood and finally will march alongside its sister
division, the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler. You
will carry the name that the Fuhrer gave you:
SS Panzer Grenadier Division "Hitler-Jugend. "32

These were explicit appeals to the boys' idealism
and further emphasis of their eliteness. In the
process, they would have also increased the
desire for the boys to
get out into the
battlefield and live ~
up to their elite ~
status,
thereby~
positively enhancing ~
their
combat
motivation.
The symbolic
elements surrounding the naming and
the symbols of the
division contributed
to the combat
motivation of the
12th SS. Along with
the 1st SS, the 12th
SS was a part of the
ISS Panzer Corps, a
formation that was
already serving on
These two photos show
Hitler Youth Rallys in
Germany before the war.
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A dead SS trooper lies in the street in Falaise, 17-18 August 1944. The soldiers of the I SS Panzer Corps were the
only Germans allowed to wear the words "Adolf Hitler" (visible just above the cuff) on their sleeves.

the Russian front but whose title was re-assigned
to this new formation in Normandy to signify an
even greater sense of eliteness. 33 Both the 1st
SS and the 12th SS were the only formations to
carry Hitler's name in their divisional title, an
honour that they subsequently wore on their
arms. Added to the symbolic similarities of the
two divisions were their emblems. The crest of
the 12th SS was that of the 1st SS with a rune
intersecting the skeleton key at the centre of the
crest. According to Hubert Meyer, through these
symbols the 12th SS was able to achieve a greater
cohesiveness, both within the division and within
the ISS Panzer Corps, and confirmed for the
Hitler Youth that they were "equal to their
comrades of the Leibstandarte," 34 thereby
creating another powerful motivator.
The uniform worn by the soldiers ofthe 12th
SS was also designed to motivate. Each member
had at least a partial camouflage uniform, a
relative luxury which made it hard to spot a 12th
SS soldier in the field, but also made them
distinctive in a crowd. 35 Both the officers and
the recruits wore the same outfit, and this

combined with the relative youthfulness of the
officer corp meant that it was virtually
impossible to tell the enlisted men from the
officers. 36 Apart from giving the soldiers an
advantage over their German comrades who did
not possess the camouflaged uniforms, the boys
in the 12th SS would have felt a sense of pride
that they were alike in appearance with their
heros, thereby increasing their combat
motivation. 37
The combat motivation of the division was
further enhanced by an elevated sense of unit
esprit. This often comes about as a result of unit
history and tradition, 38 and the 12th SS used
their common experiences in the Hitler Youth
and in the WELs and the influence of their SS
officers to quickly come together and develop a
unit bond that was defined by the fanaticism that
each soldier felt towards Hitler and Nazi
Germany. Kurt Meyer testified that "for their
fighting motto the soldiers were given the
idealistic point of view of soldierhood, in brief;
'I am nothing, we are everything.' The entire
troops were looked upon as one unit. "39 The

50
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soldiers recognized that the morale in their unit
was high, and they truly believed themselves to
be excellent soldiers, even superior to their own
German counterparts. 40

Training & the Hitler Youth

I\ unique aspect ofthe division that would give
.L"\its soldiers an even greater combat
motivation was its training. The first element was
emphasis on physical fitness. Even before
entering the 12th SS, the teenage recruits had
already undergone extensive physical training.
Professional youth leaders and educators in the
Third Reich placed physical fitness above
intellectual training in their educational
curriculum. 41 Physical education was seen as a
fundamental and inseparable part of National
Socialist education, as long as it was done under
the direction of the National Socialist
Weltanschauung. 42 As a result, physical
education classes began to take over the school's
schedule. The normal timetable allocation for
gym classes went from two to three in 1936, and
from three to five in 1938. 43 Eventually, the Hitler
Youth took over the planning of sports and
sporting events, and the sports eventually took
a militaristic tone. One of the favourite sports
was rifle marksmanship, and by 1938 the Hitler
Youth had over 1,250,000 participants in
marksmanship. 44 Even within the division, a
sporting program was set up, under the guidance
of the Nazi Guidance Officer (NSFO - see
below). 45 The result of all of this emphasis on
sport was a group of teenagers who were
physically fit and able to handle the strain of
military life, thereby producing a more content
and motivated soldier.
Another unique element in the training of
the 12th SS was the universal paramilitary
training for Hitler Youth boys between the ages
of 16 and 18. Starting in early 1942, these boys
entered the WELs which "proved to be a
successful innovation in terms of meeting what
the Nazis felt to be necessary psychological
conditioning for military combat. In a way, they
were ideologically charged basic training camps,
less pragmatic, technical, and brutal than such
camps for older draftees usually are, but more
effective in fostering the attitudes that make
military service more than a tolerable endurance
test. "46 Camp directors were primarily wounded
army officers and Waffen-SS veterans, and

trainers were army and Waffen-SS NCOs with
either reserve status or temporary domestic
assignments. The first WEL training cycle began
on 10 May 1942, and by the end of 1943 nearly
every boy of seventeen had undergone
paramilitary training. The SS took over full
control of many of the camps from the army,
and thereby had ample opportunity to recruit
from these camps into the Waffen-SSY
The quality and diversity of the WEL training
also served to further motivate the average boy
who passed through its gates. As Rempel pointed
out:
The curriculum of the WELs incorporated an
exaggerated Darwinian ideology infused with the
youthful elan of the HJ, physical exercises
highlighting its combative ethos, and the basic
techniques of war making .... [The] emphasis on
orderliness helped to instill a sense of discipline,
unquestioning obedience, and clear
subordination. "Troop-like drills" were avoided,
not only because they were inappropriate for
young boys, but also because they were less
practical than exercises designed to instill
martial attitudes .... [E]ndurance and toughness
were the primary goals. 48

The military aspects of the WEL training were
quite elaborate. Nearly half of the instruction
time allotted was spent on terrain exercises, such
as night training, patrolling, and terrain games.
Use and care of small calibre weapons took up
one quarter of the training time, and because of
the successful nature of this training in the WEL,
the army shortened its weapons training
component in their basic training. Finally,
physical exercise, first aid training, and general
housekeeping, coupled with the ideological
training, rounded out the schedule.

Ideological Preparation
t must be remembered that first and foremost,
the WELs were military in nature, but the
importance in examining and understanding the
scope of the ideological aspects of these camps
is key to understanding the later actions of the
boys of the 12th SS. Ideology, as it was presented
in the WELs, was styled to strengthen basic Nazi
precepts. A uniform lecture prepared in Berlin
and distributed to the WEL camps was given to
the boys each week, and events like lectures,
elaborate patriotic ceremonies, a nightly
"political hour" (where trainees were asked

I
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questions about the current political situations
and their relation to National Socialist ideology),
and discussions all were designed to have the
maximum psychological impact. Among the
weekly mottos were "We Fight," "We Sacrifice,"
and "We Triumph," and the various lectures were
all geared around the week's motto. Although
formal indoctrination only took up 14 hours out
of a total training schedule of 166, ideology
"permeated the entire curriculum whether it was
implemented in the barracks, on the shooting
range, exercise area, or the field. "49 Through their
involvement in the WEL, coupled with the
education received at the hands of the Nazified
educational system and within the structure of
the Hitler Youth, many of the youth proved to be
high-quality recruits, 5° thereby adding to their
already inflated sense of eliteness.
The ideological training did not stop with
the soldiers' transfer to the battlefield. Indeed,
considerable emphasis was placed on enhancing
combat motivation through intense ideological
training. The officer with the most profound and
direct impact on the ideological indoctrination
of the 12th SS was the Abt. VI of the Divisional
General Staff, the Nationalsozialistischer
Filhrungsojjizier (NSFO - Nazi Guidance
Officer). The NSFO evolved from the crisis of
motivation that occurred in the Eastern Front.
It was the responsibility of the NSFO and his
staff, under the mandate of "troop care"
(Truppenbetreuung), to distribute ideological
materials to the troops. On 16 December 1943
Brigadejilhrer Fritz Witt, the first commander
of the 12th SS, issued an order concerning the
relationship that the NSFO was to have in the
division, and the role that each officer was to
play in the ideological indoctrination of the
troops. Witt wrote:
On orders of24.2.43 from the Reichsfi.ihrer SS
[Himmler] concerning the ideological orientation
of troops, I order:
1. The leaders of the units are responsible for
the ideological education of the officers, NCO's,
and soldiers in their units.
2. The co-workers of the Abt. VI will advise and
support the commander about the
implementation of the ideological education, will
inform the unit officers and supply the necessary
prepared educational materials, will give
suggestions for the exhaustion of all possibilities
of ideological education, ... will organize and
oversee the care of troops (Truppenbetreuung)
in conjunction with the Abt. Vl of the division. 5 1

Each unit had two classes each week specifically
for ideological training. At the end of each week,
the unit officer was required to submit reports
concerning the conduct of the ideological
training. Each unit officer was also provided with
a list of daily political questions which they were
to use in instructing their troops. The officers
under the Abt. VI were to aid the unit officer by
providing them with the proper instructional
material. Witt also appealed to the officers to
participate regularly in the ideological
indoctrination of the troops. They were ordered
to attend monthly meetings with Witt for
instruction in indoctrination, and each unit
commander was ordered to conduct formal
ideological training for two hours each week and
to conduct discussions for one hour each week.
Each Sunday they were also to conduct an
informal "community" time where ideological
questions were to be discussed. Finally, Witt
urged each officer to talk about day-to-day
ideological matters that arose at every possible
occasion. The purpose behind this
indoctrination was to make every man within
the division "a convinced carrier" of the National
Socialist ideology, and to transform the Hitler
Youth into an SS man "who lives according to
the fundamentals of the SS as a fanatic
warrior. "52
It was constantly stressed to the 12th SS
officers that, like the WELs, ideology must
permeate in all aspects of day-to-day life in the
division. The progress of the ideological
indoctrination was constantly monitored by the
NSFO. For example, within three days of an
ideological event being staged (like a film, a
lecture or a theatre production) for a particular
unit, the unit leader had to submit a "morale
report" to the Abt. Vl outlining the strengths and
weaknesses of the event. Aside from the usual
questions (which unit attended, what kind of
event was it), the officer had to indicate how the
troops received the event (either positively or
negatively) and if there were suggestions for
further events. 5 3

Preparing the Division for Battle

I\ nother factor that set the 12th SS apart from
r-liheir comrades was the scope, and the
sometimes unorthodox nature, of their training
once they were assembled in Beverloo. As Kurt
Meyer stated, "training was made to approximate
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war conditions. All exercises were conducted
with live ammunition and with fighting weapons,
not training weapons. The losses which thereby
resulted had to be taken in order to avoid losses
during action. "54 The use of live fire during
training was certainly risky and unorthodox, but
this type of training made the soldiers focus on
their job and, in turn, highly motivated the
survivors of the training. 55 In order to achieve
the goals of toughening the recruits mentally,
building confidence, and enhancing knowledge
of weapons and equipment, the officers
sometimes resorted to curious measures. For
instance, in order to familiarize the Panzer crews
and officers with the machines they were to take
into battle, SS-Obersturmbannjilhrer Max
Wi.insche, the CO of the 12th SS Panzer
Regiment, took the soldiers to the MAN tank
production factory in Nuremberg and had them
work between eight and 14 days in the assembly
area. 56 In one exercise, the CO of one infantry
battalion required his soldiers, fully equipped
with weapons and supplies, to leap 30 feet into
a deep sand pit to train recruits to never hesitate
in combat. In another demonstration, one
instructor, in an attempt to show that grenade
splinters only travelled laterally and upwards,
detonated the weapon atop his head on his
helmet. Other exercises had the youth
disassembling and rebuilding their weapons with
their eyes bound or while in the dark. 57
The health of the soldiers was also
emphasized, with the knowledge that healthy,
well-fed soldiers would perform better in battle.
In order to promote physical development in the
still-growing boys, and mindful of the fact that
active teenaged boys need an enormous amount
of calories per day, the soldiers of the 12th SS
received special rations, the outcome of an
agreement between the German High Command
and SS-Obergruppenjilhrer Oswald Pohl, the
Chief of the SS Wirtschajts-und Verwaltungshauptamt (Economic and Administrative Main
Office). The weekly ration for each soldier
consisted of3.5litres of fresh milk, 1, 750 grams
ofbread, 200 grams of meat, 140 grams oflard,
120 grams of sugar, and 245 grams of other
nutrients, which, according to Pohl, was more
substantial than the rations allotted to workers
in heavy industry. 58 Instead of the cigarette ration
that most soldiers received, the soldiers of the
12th SS had to be content with a ration of hard
candy until they turned 18. 59 Any relationship

with a woman was strictly prohibited until the
boy turned 18, so the soldiers were forbidden
to patronize the local brothels. The consumption
of alcohol was also strictly forbidden. 60 In the
few documents that remain concerning
discipline in the 12th SS, the evidence points to
strict discipline against those who broke these
rules. 61
Finally, the 12th SS also held certain
advantages over other German units when it
came to equipment. Although it is true that the
12th SS struggled in obtaining some supplies,
such as gasoline, in other ways it received more
than what was normally allocated to divisions.
According to Eric Lefevre, 62 a normal Panzer
Division by 1944 had one Panzer regiment, two
Panzer Grenadier regiments (one motorized, one
a combination motorized and armoured), a
reconnaissance battalion, an anti-tank battalion,
an artillery regiment, an anti-aircraft battalion,
an engineer battalion, and various other subunits (like signals, medical, etc), for a total
strength of 14,787 officers and men. To this the
12th SS added more men and equipment. The
list included: an additional mortar battalion
(Weiferabteiluung) of 24 Nebelwerfers and a
battery of280/320 artillery; an extra company
of 22 Panzer IV tanks (giving it a total of 182
tanks rather than the normal160); 1,000 more
men in each of the division's two infantry
regiments; seven more self-propelled anti-tank
guns than a regular Panzer division in Normandy
in 1944 and the eventual replacement of towed
AT guns by self-propelled PanzeTjiigers; and
finally the engineer battalion assigned to the 12th
SS was motorized and armoured, a luxury that
was uncommon in comparable units. As a result
of all this, the 12th SS ended up with a total
strength of 19,090 men, over 4,000 more
soldiers than what would be expected.

The Result

T

he message the 12th SS was clear and
sustained, and this had an influence on their
morale and their motivation. The division
received more men, more heavy weapons, better
rations, and, according to Kurt Meyer, better
training than any other division in Normandy. 5 3
The soldiers also had maintained a faith in their
weapons, 5 4 consequently giving them enormous
confidence going into battle. Given the previous
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teachings that they were racially superior and
given the martial aspect of German society and
education, there is little doubt that most of the
teenagers in the 12th SS would have a feeling of
invincibility. The feelings of superiority, the esprit
de corps, the superior training, and the
overabundance of equipment that the 12th SS
possessed all combined to enhance the combat
motivation of the soldiers to a level unreached
by other units in the European war. For the
fanatical soldier, these tangible motivators are
necessary in order to implement the teachings
that the ideological indoctrination had forced
them to internalize. It is no wonder, then, that
the soldiers had "laughter in their eyes" and a
"faith in their strength and the will to fight" before
their first battle 65 and why their inability to
prevail on the battlefield led to fury spent on
helpless prisoners.
The story of the 12th SS is indeed a tragic
and cautionary tale. The world view to which
these fanatics adhered was thoroughly imbued
with the glorification of war, and this led to
puzzling, radical, and abominable behaviour,
like grinding the bodies of Canadian dead under
the tracks of their vehicles. These, though, are
not the only examples of collective deviant
behaviour by the members of the 12th SS. For
example, one soldier was very upset because his
wound came from a piece of falling brick.
Untersturmfiihrer Gerhard Amler recalled that
Hauptsturmfiihrer Heydrich "cried on my
shoulder ... Not even a proper wound! How would
it look, him standing there and having to admit
that a chunk of brick had fallen on his head."
However, later Heydrich could be happy because
his arm was in a plaster cast, thereby being
"properly wounded and would not have to be
ashamed any longer. "66 Caught in a web of lies
in a society that was built on them, these
teenagers never received a reasonable
opportunity to question what they were doing.
What is most tragic is that these fanatical
teenagers believed that what they were doing was
correct. Even after the war, many believed that
they had done nothing wrong.
The fanaticism of the 12th SS resulted in
the virtual annihilation of the division by the end
of the Normandy campaign: their wish for death
or glory met largely by a squalid burial in an
unmarked roadside grave. Although exact
casualty rates are unknown, it is estimated that

only 30 per cent of the division escaped across
the Seine in August 1944. For Canadians, the
tragic legacy of these fanatical young soldiers lies
in the cemeteries at Beny-sur-Mer and
Bretteville-sur-Laize, and in the monuments to
their brutality at the Abbey d'Ardenne and the
Chateau d'Audrieu: mute testimony to both the
cost of the war and the need for it in the flrst
place.
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